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    "parsed_content": "BrazilWhat Washington May Misread in Brazil\u2019s Election \n By Fernanda Magnotta | September 24, 2026 \nPresident Lula and Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro have more in common than meets the eye on key issues, including trade with China and critical minerals.\nTowels for sale depicting Brazilian presidential candidates Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva and Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro in Bras\u00edlia in September 2026.Sergio Lima \/ AFP via Getty Images\nReading Time: 4 minutes\nS\u00c3O PAULO\u2014Brazil\u2019s October election presents Washington with a genuine foreign-policy contrast. President Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva\u2019s\u00a0platform\u00a0places strategic autonomy, universalist diplomacy,\u00a0BRICS, and the Global South at the center of Brazil\u2019s international role. Meanwhile, Senator Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro\u2019s\u00a0campaign\u00a0promises to repair relations with the U.S. and other traditional partners, restore a more pragmatic diplomacy, and give greater weight to trade, investment, and engagement with Western institutions such as the OECD.\nYet this does not translate neatly into a choice between Washington and Beijing. Lula\u00a0seeks\u00a0diversified partnerships and rejects the logic of a new Cold War. Bolsonaro\u00a0favors\u00a0negotiating with everyone, \u201cfrom China to the European Union, from the United States to Asian markets,\u201d while avoiding excessive dependence on any one partner. In other words, Lula would not exclude the U.S., and Bolsonaro\u2019s greater receptiveness to Washington would not amount to automatic alignment on every issue.\nThe reason is partly structural: China is embedded in Brazil\u2019s commercial and production networks. In the first eight months of this year, China absorbed 30.7% of Brazilian exports, compared with 9.6% for the U.S., according to\u00a0official trade data.\nFormer president Jair Bolsonaro\u2019s own trajectory illustrates the constraints. During the 2018 campaign, he warned that China was\u00a0\u201cbuying Brazil,\u201d\u00a0and advisers in his foreign-policy circle cast Beijing as an ideological threat. Once in office, however, he adopted a more pragmatic stance toward China, encouraged trade and investment, and ultimately left\u00a0Huawei\u00a0eligible to supply Brazil\u2019s 5G networks despite pressure from Washington. Agribusiness was central to that adjustment: with China as the leading buyer of Brazilian soybeans and other farm exports, the sector had strong incentives to prevent an ideological dispute from jeopardizing its largest market. The episode offers a useful precedent: even a government elected on sharply anti-China rhetoric found that Brazil\u2019s economic structure imposed limits on alignment with the U.S.\u00a0\nSimilar logic applies to Brazil\u2019s critical minerals, where trade, industrial policy, technological competition, and national security intersect. Rare earths, a subset of that broader category, are essential to the magnets used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics and defense systems and more. A\u00a0study\u00a0prepared for Brazil\u2019s Ministry of Mines and Energy by\u00a0CEBRI\u00a0and\u00a0Vallya\u00a0estimates that China accounts for about 70% of the world\u2019s rare-earth production and 94% of magnet manufacturing. Brazil holds an estimated 23.1% of the world\u2019s rare earths, with reserves of 21 million metric tons.\u00a0\nThose numbers make Brazil attractive to Washington. While Lula and Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro each have their own strategies to capitalize on Brazil\u2019s rare-earth resources, their strategies are not as different as one might assume. Despite all the talk of polarization, the country\u2019s political spectrum still largely agrees on trade, especially issues like critical minerals. The election outcome is unlikely to change this.\nCommon ground\nLula\u2019s\u00a0platform\u00a0treats critical minerals as part of a state-coordinated strategy of reindustrialization and technological sovereignty. He proposes organizing supply chains, expanding domestic processing, and preventing the \u201csimple export\u201d of strategic raw materials. Meanwhile, Bolsonaro\u2019s\u00a0program\u00a0offers a more market-oriented model: the state as regulator and coordinator rather than entrepreneur. He emphasizes market incentives, faster technical licensing, and stable rules to attract private investment and therefore technology transfer.\nBut Bolsonaro\u2019s platform, for example, also rejects exporting raw materials and emphasizes domestic value addition and local employment. And neither defines Brazil\u2019s interest as maximizing extraction for a preferred foreign buyer.\nThat position is now reinforced by law. Brazil\u2019s new\u00a0Law 15,506\u00a0makes domestic value addition, technology transfer, regional development, and sovereignty key objectives of its critical-minerals policy. It also provides mechanisms to screen for changes in corporate control, outsize foreign influence, transfers of mining rights, and international supply agreements that could affect Brazil\u2019s economic or geopolitical security. It specifically allows export-related value-addition requirements and creates a council to monitor these factors, including states, municipalities, companies, and universities.\u00a0\nWhen it was\u00a0debated\u00a0in the Senate earlier this year, the bill drew input and support from lawmakers across the political spectrum. Even amid intense political polarization, lawmakers found plenty of common ground on critical minerals.\nCore frameworks\nWhoever wins the election, they will not control the rare earth supply chain unilaterally. Right off the bat, projects depend on approval from Congress, the National Mining Agency, environmental authorities, state and local governments, concession holders, investors, and affected communities. Rare-earth deposits may also contain naturally occurring\u00a0radioactive materials\u00a0such as thorium, bringing nuclear-safety bodies into the process. A Fl\u00e1vio Bolsonaro administration might prioritize faster decisions and U.S.-backed investment, while a Lula government might demand more stringent conditions. Even so, neither could bypass the sector\u2019s legal, federal, and social architecture.\nThe acquisition of\u00a0Serra Verde\u00a0in the state of Goi\u00e1s shows what meaningful access requires. The announced\u00a0package\u00a0included a 15-year agreement covering 100% of Phase I production, guaranteed floor prices, and a $565 million financing deal with the\u00a0U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. The U.S. improved its position by providing capital, risk protection, and a long-term market, not simply political goodwill. Brazil\u2019s new screening and value-addition frameworks require these kinds of outlays from prospective partners.\nWhat Washington may misread, then, is what the contrasts between Lula and Bolsonaro might actually mean in practice. The two candidates place different weights on strategic autonomy, markets and ties with the U.S., which shape project selection and bargaining style. Either way, however, Brazil\u2019s core interests, frameworks, and institutions will not change much, and they will continue to define the country\u2019s posture on a range of key policies, including trade with China, critical mineral supply chains, and other issues.\nEssentially, political affinity will not automatically translate into commercial access or strategic control. The election outcome might shift affinity and facilitate access, but it will not guarantee control. No matter who wins, the U.S. and its firms will have to make offers that treat Brazil not merely as a commodity supplier, but as a country seeking a larger place in the value chain.\nABOUT THE AUTHORFernanda MagnottaReading Time: 4 minutesMagnotta is a senior fellow at the Brazilian Center for International Relations and a professor of the International Relations Program at Funda\u00e7\u00e3o Armando Alvares Penteado in S\u00e3o Paulo.\nFollow Fernanda Magnotta: LinkedIn | X\/Twitter\n \n \n \n \n \n \nTags: Brazil, China, China and Latin America, critical minerals, Elections 2026, Flavio Bolsonaro, Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva, rare earths, U.S. Policy\nAny opinions expressed in this piece do not necessarily reflect those of Americas Quarterly or its publishers.",
    "author_name": "Fernanda Magnotta",
    "site_name": "Americas Quarterly",
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    "ai_headline": "What Washington May Misread in Brazil\u2019s Election",
    "ai_simplified_title": "Washington Misreads Brazil Election Dynamics",
    "ai_excerpt": "Brazil's upcoming election presents a foreign-policy contrast between Lula and Bolsonaro, but both candidates share common ground on key issues like trade with China and critical minerals. Washington may misinterpret these nuances, as Brazil's core interests and frameworks will likely remain consistent regardless of the election outcome.",
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        "Latin America",
        "Critical Minerals",
        "Elections 2026",
        "Flavio Bolsonaro",
        "Luiz In\u00e1cio Lula da Silva",
        "Rare Earths",
        "U.S. Policy"
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